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Abstract 
 
In this work we have presented a genetic algorithm 
approach for classifying normal connections and 
intrusions. We have created a serial combination of two 
light-weight genetic algorithm-based intrusion detection 
systems where each of the systems exhibits certain 
deficiency. In this way we have managed to mitigate the 
deficiencies of both of them. The model was verified on 
KDD99 intrusion detection dataset, generating a solution 
competitive with the solutions reported by the state-of-
the-art, while using small subset of features from the 
original set that contains forty one features. The most 
significant features were identified by deploying principal 
component analysis and multi expression programming. 
Furthermore, our system is adaptable since it permits re-
training by using new data. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Along with providing revolution in communication and 
information exchange, Internet has also provided greater 
opportunity for disruption and sabotage of data previously 
considered secure. As most of the Internet service 
protocols were designed at the time when Internet 
environment was a non-hostile one, slight attention was 
paid to the possibility of security flaws. The current 
protocols are the upgrades of the previous ones and have 
inherited all the security flaws which make them prone to 
various types of attacks. Furthermore, operating systems 
contain many bugs that make them susceptible to certain 
types of attack. The attacks to Internet service providers 
are carried out by exploiting these unknown weaknesses 
or security flaws [1].  
Computer networks are usually protected against 
attacks by a number of access restriction policies that act 
as a coarse grain filter (anti-virus software, firewall, 
message encryption, secured network protocols, password 
protection). Intrusion detection systems (IDS) are the fine 
grain filter placed inside the protected network, looking 
for known or potential threats in network traffic and/or 
audit data recorded by hosts. 
Intrusion detection systems have three common 
problems: speed, accuracy and adaptability. The speed 
problem arises from the extensive amount of data that 
these systems need to monitor in order to perceive the 
entire situation. Thus, we need to extract the most 
important piece of information that can be deployed for 
efficient detection of attacks. At this point we have used 
the results obtained in our previous work [2] where we 
deployed Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and the 
results obtained in [3] deploying Multi Expression 
Programming (MEP), in order to extract the most relevant 
features of the data. The features used for describing 
attacks are identified by deploying PCA technique, while 
the features used for describing normal connections are 
identified by MEP. In this way the total amount of data to 
be processed is highly reduced. As an important benefit of 
this arises the high speed of training the system and 
afterwards of its testing thus providing the possibility of 
real-time deployment. 
Incorporation of learning algorithms provides a 
potential solution for the adaptation and accuracy issues 
of the intrusion detection problem [4]. In this work we are 
presenting genetic algorithm (GA) approach for 
classifying normal connections and intrusions. Genetic 
Algorithm approach is one of the forthcoming approaches 
in computer security and has only recently been 
recognized as having potential in the intrusion detection 
field [5], [6], mostly because of its suitability for dealing 
with the classification of rare classes [7]. 
This work represents continuation of our previous one 
[2] where we investigated the possibilities of applying GA 
to intrusion detection when only small subset of features is 
deployed. One of the systems was detecting only 
intrusions without identifying the type of the attacks, 
while the other one was able to identify the exact type of 
an attack. An important characteristic of this system is its 
simplicity. It is easy to understand and to train, as its 
training is a straightforward one. These experiments have 
confirmed the robustness of GA when deployed to 
intrusion detection and inspired us to further continue 
experimenting on the subject. 
Here we have further investigated a combination of 
two simple GA-based intrusion detection systems with the 
opposite qualities in the terms of detection and false-
positive rate, as opposed to the existing single solutions 
presented by the state-of-the-art [2], [5], [6], [8]. In 
addition, we have used less-common serial combination of 
two intrusion detection systems [9], opposing to the 
commonly used parallel connection of multiple 
classification systems deployed for intrusion detection 
with various combinations for decision making [10]. Our 
aim was to mitigate the negative aspects of a certain 
system by supplementing another system with better 
performances in the terms of the same aspect. 
In our serial combination, the first system exhibits very 
high detection rate but also high false-positive rate and the 
second one exhibits very low false-positive rate (lower 
than presented by the state-of-the-art), although lower 
detection rate than the first one. The combination results 
in significantly lower false-positive rate than the first one 
exhibits while maintaining high level of detection rate. In 
this way we have demonstrated that deploying serial 
connection of two GA-based systems with opposite 
qualities, the resulting system exhibits better 
characteristics than both of the original ones. 
For evolving tour GA-based system KDD99Cup 
training and testing dataset was used [10]. KDD99Cup 
dataset was found to have quite drawbacks [12], [13], but 
despite of the shortcomings, it is still prevailing dataset 
used for training and testing of IDSes due to its good 
structure, i.e. every connection is described using 41 
features and is labeled, thus providing the information 
whether the connection is normal or it is a specific attack 
type [5], [6].  
In the following text Sections 2 gives the overview on 
GAs and IDSes and the benefits of deploying GA to 
intrusion detection field. Section 3 details the 
implementation if the system. Section 4 introduces the 
problem of classifying rare classes and the solutions to the 
problem deployed in this work. Section 5 presents the 
benchmark KDD99 dataset deployed for training and 
testing and evaluates the performance of the system on the 
benchmark dataset and discusses the results. Finally, the 
conclusions are drawn in Section 6. 
 
2. Genetic Algorithm Approach to Intrusion 
Detection 
 
Genetic algorithms (GA) are search algorithms based 
on the principles of natural selection and genetics. The 
bases of genetic algorithm approach are given by Holland 
[14] and it has been deployed to solve wide range of 
problems in computer science, engineering, economics, 
mathematics and many others.  
The most important idea that stands beyond the initial 
creation of GAs is the aim of developing a system as 
robust and as adaptable to the environment as the natural 
systems are. GA operates on a population of potential 
solutions applying the principle of the survival of the 
fittest to produce better and better approximations to the 
solution of the problem that GA is trying to solve. At each 
generation, a new set of approximations is created by the 
process of selecting individuals according to their level of 
fitness value in the problem domain and breeding them 
together using the operators borrowed from the genetic 
process performed in nature, i.e. crossover and mutation. 
This process leads to the evolution of the populations of 
individuals that are better adapted to their environment 
than the individuals that they were created from, just as it 
happens in natural adaptation [15]. 
 
2.1. Intrusion Detection Systems – Types and 
Issues 
 
According to the detection mechanism they use, exist 
two general categories of IDSes: misuse detection and 
anomaly based. Misuse detection systems are most widely 
used and they detect intruders with known patterns. As 
only the attacks that already exist in the attack database 
can be detected, this model needs continuous updating. 
Their virtue is very low false positive rate. Anomaly 
detection systems identify deviations from normal 
behaviour and alert to potential unknown or novel attacks 
without having any prior knowledge of them. They exhibit 
higher rate of false alarms, but they have the ability of 
detecting unknown attacks. 
Another classification of IDSes is determined by the 
resource they monitor. According to this classification, 
IDSes are divided into two categories: host based and 
network based. Host based intrusion detection systems 
monitor host resources for intrusion traces whereas 
network based intrusion detection systems try to find 
intrusion signs in the network data. The current trend in 
intrusion detection is to combine both host based and 
network based information to develop hybrid systems and 
therefore not rely on only one methodology. 
As already stated in the introduction, IDSes have three 
common problems: speed, accuracy and adaptability. The 
speed problem arises from the extensive amount of data 
that intrusion detection systems need to monitor in order 
to perceive the entire situation. In order to cope with it, 
the most important piece of information should be 
extracted so to facilitate an efficient detection of attacks. 
The adaptation and accuracy issues of the intrusion 
detection can be solved by incorporating learning 
algorithms. In the case of intrusion detection, learning 
means discovering patterns of normal behaviour or pattern 
of attacks. This formulation of intrusion detection problem 
combines the advantages of signature-based and anomaly-
based IDS. Thanks to the generalisation capability of 
learning algorithms, it is also possible to detect new 
attacks that exploit the same vulnerabilities of known 
attacks. 
 
2.2. Genetic Algorithm Overview 
 
GA evolves a population of initial individuals to a 
population of high quality individuals, where each 
individual represents a solution of the problem to be 
solved. Each individual is called chromosome, and is 
composed of a predetermined number of genes. The 
quality of each rule is measured by a fitness function as 
the quantitative representation of each rule’s adaptation to 
a certain environment. The procedure starts from an initial 
population of randomly generated individuals. Then the 
population is evolved for a number of generations while 
gradually improving the qualities of the individuals in the 
sense of increasing the fitness value as the measure of 
quality. During each generation, three basic genetic 
operators are sequentially applied to each individual with 
certain probabilities, i.e. selection, crossover and 
mutation. Crossover consists of exchanging of the genes 
between two chromosomes performed in a certain way, 
while mutation consists of random changing of a value of 
a randomly chosen gene of a chromosome. Both crossover 
and mutation are performed with a certain possibility, 
called crossover/mutation rate. The algorithm flow is 
presented in Fig 1.  
 
Figure1. Genetic algorithm flow 
 
Determination of the following factors has the crucial 
impact on the efficiency of the algorithm: selection of 
fitness function, representation of individuals and the 
values of GA parameters (crossover and mutation rate, 
size of population, number of generations). This 
determination usually depends on the application.  
 
2.3. The Benefits of Deploying GA to Intrusion 
Detection 
 
Deployment of GA in the intrusion detection field 
offers number of advantages, namely: 
• GAs are intrinsically parallel, since they have 
multiple offspring, they can explore the solution 
space in multiple directions at once. If one path 
turns out to be a dead end, they can easily 
eliminate it and continue working on more 
promising avenues, giving them a greater chance 
by each run of finding the optimal solution. 
• Due to the parallelism that allows them to 
implicitly evaluate many schemas at once, GAs are 
particularly well-suited to solving problems where 
the space of all potential solutions is truly huge - 
too vast to search exhaustively in any reasonable 
amount of time, as network data is.  
• Working with populations of candidate solutions 
rather than a single solution and employing 
stochastic operators to guide the search process 
permit GAs to cope well with attribute interactions 
and to avoid getting stuck in local maxima, which 
together make them very suitable for dealing with 
classifying rare class, as intrusions are. 
• System based on GA can easily be re-trained, thus 
providing the possibility of evolving new rules for 
intrusion detection. This property provides the 
adaptability of a GA-based system, which is an 
imperative quality of an intrusion detection system 
having in mind the high rate of emerging of new 
attacks.  
 
3. System Implementation 
 
The implemented IDS is a serial combination of two 
IDSes. The complete system is presented in Fig. 2. The 
first part is a linear classifier whose false-positive rate 
should be reduced. As having very low false-negative rate, 
its decision on normal connections is considered correct. 
But, for its high false-positive rate, its decision on attacks 
is re-checked by the rule-based system. The rule-based 
system filters the normal connections from the potential 
attacks, as its rules are trained for detecting normal 
connections. This part of the system exhibits very low 
false-positive rate, i.e. the probability for an attack to be 
incorrectly classified as a normal connection is very low. 
In this way, the false-positive rate of the entire system is 
significantly lower than the false-positive rate of the linear 
classifier while exhibiting high detection rate. 
 
Figure 2.  Block Diagram of the Complete System 
 
As already mentioned, the first part is a simple linear 
classifier which classifies the connections based on the 
linear combination of the three features identified as those 
that have the highest possibility to take part in an attack by 
deploying PCA [2]. The three selected features and their 
explanations are presented in Table 1. 
  
Table 1. The features used to describe the attacks 
Name of the feature Explication 
duration length (number of seconds) of the 
connection 
src_bytes number of data bytes from source 
to destination 
dst_host_srv_serror_rate percentage of connections that have 
“SYN” errors 
 
The linear classifier is evolved using GA algorithm as 
described in the previous section. Each chromosome, i.e. 
potential solution to the problem, in the population is 
comprised of four genes, where the first three represent 
coefficients of the linear classifier and the fourth one 
represents the threshold value. The decision whether the 
current connection is an attack is made according to the 
formula (1): 
gene(1)*con(duration)+gene(2)*con(src_bytes)+ 
gene(3)*con(dst_host_srv_serror_rate)<gene(4) 
(1) 
where con(duration), con(src_bytes) and 
con(dst_host_srv_serror_rate) are the values of the 
duration, src_bytes and dst_host_srv_serror_rate feature 
of the current connection.  
The linear classifier was trained using incremental, i.e. 
the algorithm where the number of individuals is 
increasing in every generation and a certain number of the 
worst individuals is substituted in each generation with the 
newly-bred ones. The population contained 1000 
individuals which were trained during 300 generations. 
The mutation rate was 0.1 while the crossover rate was 
0.9. The previous numbers were chosen after certain 
number of experiments. The size of the population and the 
number of generations are selected in the manner that their 
further increasing doesn’t bring significant performance 
improvement nor overfitting. The type of crossover 
deployed was uniform crossover, i.e. a new individual had 
equal chances to contain either of the genes of both of its 
parents. The performance measurement, i.e. the fitness 
function, was the squared percentage of the correctly 
classified connections, i.e. according to the formula: 
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where count is the number of correctly classified 
connections, while numOfCon is the number of 
connections in the training dataset. The squared 
percentage rather than the simple percentage value was 
chosen because it exhibited better. The result of this GA 
was its best individual which forms the first part of the 
system presented in Fig.2.  
The second part of the system presented in Fig. 2 is a 
rule-based system, where simple if-then rules for 
distinguishing normal connections are evolved. For that 
reason, the most important features for a normal 
connection are identified using Multi Expression 
Programming [3]. These three features and their 
explanations are listed in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. The features used to describe normal 
connections 
Name of the 
feature 
Explication 
service Destination service (e.g. telnet, ftp) 
hot number of hot indicators 
logged in 1 if successfully logged in; 0 otherwise 
 
An example of a rule can be the following one: 
if (service=”http” and hot=”0” and logged_in=”0”)  
  then normal; 
The rules were trained using incremental GA, 500 
individuals that were trained during 300 generations, with 
crossover and mutation rate 0.9 and 0.1 respectively. The 
selection of the number of generations and the population 
size is performed analogously to the linear classifier. In 
this case simple one–point crossover was used because the 
change of the crossover type doesn’t make a difference in 
this case. The result of the training was a set of 200 best-
performed rules. The performance measurement (the 
fitness function) in this case was the F-value with the 
parameter 0.8: 
FNTP
TP
recall
FPTP
TPprecision
recallprecision
precisionrecallfitness
+
=
+
=
+
=
*8.0
**8.1
 
 
(3) 
where TP, FP and FN make parts of a confusion matrix 
typically used to evaluate performance of a machine 
learning algorithm presented in Table 3. In classification 
problems, class “C” is the class of the interest, i.e. that 
class that is being detecting (in this case normal 
connections) and “NC” as a conjunction of all the other 
classes. Parameter value of 0.8 was chosen after 
performing few experiments with different values as the 
value that provided the best performances of the system in 
the terms of both detection and false-positive rate. 
 
Table 3. Confusion matrix for defining four possible 
outcomes when classifying class “C” 
 Predicted Class “C” Predicted Class “NC” 
Actual Class 
“C” 
True Positives (TP) False Negative (FN) 
Actual Class 
“NC” 
False Positives (FP) True Negative (TN) 
 
The algorithm was performed as presented in Section 
2. The system presented here was implemented in C++ 
programming language. The software for this work used 
the GAlib genetic algorithm package, written by Matthew 
Wall at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology [16]. 
The time of training the implemented system is 185 
seconds while the testing process takes 45 seconds. The 
system was demonstrated on AMD Athlon 64 X2 Dual 
Core Processor 3800+ with 1GB RAM memory on its 
disposal.  
 
4. Imbalanced Classes Problem in Intrusion 
Detection  
 
The task of detecting intrusions belongs to the problem 
of detecting so-called rare or imbalanced classes since 
intrusions occur rarely, i.e. in real-world the percentage of 
intrusive data is very small comparing to the percentage of 
normal data. Besides, some intrusions occur more rarely 
than the others, which make the classification task even 
more complicated. Conventional learning techniques 
exhibit certain deficiencies when dealing with rare classes 
[7]. The most important shortcoming is the tendency for 
generalization, which usually results in wrong 
classification of the instances of rare classes.  
As stated before, genetic algorithms are global search 
techniques that work with populations of candidate 
solutions rather than a single solution and employ 
stochastic operators to guide the search process. These 
characteristics permit genetic algorithms to cope well with 
attribute interactions and avoid getting stuck in local 
maxima. In this way both generalization and data 
fragmentation are avoided which are both inappropriate 
for dealing with rare classes. Besides this intrinsic 
capability of GAs, we have deployed F-measure as the 
evaluation metrics that is proven to be very suitable when 
dealing with imbalanced classes [7]. F-measure is a 
combination of precision and recall. The precision of a 
classification rule, or set of rules, is the percentage of 
times the predictions associated with the rule(s) are 
correct. If these  rules predict class X then recall is the 
percentage of all examples belonging to X that are covered 
by these rule(s). Rare cases and classes are valued when 
using these metrics because both precision and recall are 
defined with respect to the positive (rare) class.  
 
5. Results 
 
Learning algorithms have a training phase where they 
mathematically ’learn’ the patterns in the input dataset. 
The input dataset is also called the training set which 
should contain sufficient and representative instances of 
the patterns being discovered. A dataset instance is 
composed of features, which describe the dataset instance. 
Learned patterns can be used to make predictions on a 
new dataset instance based on its diversity from normal 
patterns or its similarity to known attack patterns or a 
combination of both. 
In order to promote the comparison of advanced 
research in the area of intrusion detection, the Lincoln 
Laboratory at MIT, under DARPA sponsorship, 
conducted the 1998 and 1999 evaluation of intrusion 
detection [17]. Based on binary TCP dump data provided 
by DARPA evaluation, millions of connection statistics 
are collected and generated to form the training and test 
data in the Classifier Learning Contest organized in 
conjunction with the 5th ACM SIGKDD International 
Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining 
1999 (KDD-99) [11]. The learning task was to build a 
detector (i.e. a classifier) capable of distinguishing 
between “bad” connections, called intrusions or attacks, 
and “good” or normal connections. 
 
5.1. Training and Testing Datasets 
 
The dataset contains 5,000,000 network connection 
records. A connection is a sequence of TCP packets 
starting and ending at some well defined times, between 
which data flows from a source IP address to a target IP 
address under some well defined protocol [18]. The 
training portion of the dataset (labelled as 
“kdd_10_percent”) contains 494,021 connections of 
which 20% are normal. Each connection record contains 
41 independent fields and a label (normal or type of 
attack). Each attack belongs to one of the four attack 
categories: user to root, remote to local, probe, and denial 
of service. The testing dataset (labelled “corrected”) 
provides a dataset with a significantly different statistical 
distribution than the training dataset and contains an 
additional 14 (unseen) attacks not included in the training 
dataset. The basic characteristics of the datasets are given 
in Table 4. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. The basic characteristics of KDD99 datasets 
Dataset Label Number of 
Attacks 
Number of Normal 
Connections 
kdd_10_percent 396743 97277 
corrected 250436 60593 
 
5.2. Dataset Issues 
 
The most important flaws of the mentioned dataset are 
the following ones [12]: 
• The dataset contains biases that may be reflected in 
the performance of the evaluated systems. 
• None of the sources explaining the dataset contains 
any discussion of the data rate, and its variation with 
time is not specified. 
• The skewed nature of the attack distribution may 
represent a bias that affects the results of the 
evaluation. 
• There is no discussion of whether the quantity of 
data presented is sufficient to train a statistical 
anomaly system or other learning-based system. 
Furthermore, in [13] is demonstrated that the 
transformation model used for transforming raw 
DARPA’s network data to a well-featured data item set is 
‘poor’. Here ‘poor’ refers to the fact that some attribute 
values are the same in different data items that have 
different class labels. Due to this, some of the attacks 
can’t be classified correctly. 
 
5.3. Obtained Rates 
 
The system was trained using “kdd_10_percent” and 
tested on “corrected” dataset. The obtained results are 
summarized in Table 5. Presented rates of the linear 
classifier and whole system are the rates for detecting 
attacks, while the rates of the rule-based system are for 
detecting normal connections. The last column gives the 
value of classical F-measure so that learning results could 
be easily compared with a unique feature for both recall 
and precision. Our previous statement of high reducing of 
the false-positive rate while maintaining high detection 
rate is confirmed, as the false-positive rate is reduced from 
40.7% to 2.7%, while the detection rate has reduced for 
only 0.15%.  The increasing of F-value is also exhibited. 
The adaptability of the system was tested as well by 
first training the system with a subset of 
“kdd_10_percent” (250,000 connections out of 491,021). 
The generated rules were taken as the initial generation 
and re-trained with the remaining data of 
“kdd_10_percent” dataset. Both of the systems were 
tested on “corrected” dataset. The system exhibited 
improvements in both detection and false positive rate. 
The improvements are presented in the Table 6. 
 
Table 5. The performances of the whole system and its 
parts separately 
Detection rate False Positive 
Rate 
System  
Num. Per. 
(%) 
Num. Per. 
(%) 
F-measure 
Linear 
Classifier 
231030 92.25 24628 40.7 0.913 
Rule-
based  
45504 75.1 5537 2.2 0.815 
Whole 
system 
230625 92.1 862 1.4 0.96 
 
5.4. Discussion 
 
The final results are similar to those presented in [5] 
and [6], although we have used smaller subset of features. 
Hence, our system can perform the training process and 
the process of detecting intrusions faster while 
maintaining high detection rates. 
 
Table 6. The performance of the system after re-training 
Detection rate False 
Positive 
Rate 
System  
Num. Per 
(%) 
Num Per 
(%) 
F-
meas
ure 
Whole system 
after trained with 
a subset of 
“kdd_10_percent” 
183060 73.1 1468 2.4 0.84 
Whole system 
after re-trained 
with the rest of the 
data from 
“kdd_10_percent” 
231039 92.3 862 1.4 0.96 
 
The drawbacks of the dataset have influenced the 
gained rates. As reported in [13], some of the newly 
introduced attacks from the testing dataset are very similar 
to the normal connections which make them very prone to 
incorrect classification. As comparison, the detection rate 
of the system tested on the same data that it was trained 
on, i.e. “kdd_10_percent”, is 99.2% comparing to the 
detection rate of 92.1% after testing the system using 
“corrected” dataset. The decreasing of detection rate by 
8% is obtained due to the significantly different statistical 
distribution of the datasets. In addition, the distribution of 
the attacks and normal connection in the datasets is not 
very realistic [12], i.e. only 20% of the training data set 
makes normal connections while in real world the 
situation is quite opposite, as the percentage of normal 
packets highly exceeds the percentage of intrusive ones. 
This distribution is highly inconvenient for training 
anomaly systems (as this system is). Thus, everything 
stated here had negative effect on the rates obtained in this 
work. 
The adaptability of the system was also tested by 
training the system first with a fraction of 
“kdd_10_percent” and after that training the obtained 
system with the rest of the dataset. Improvements in both 
detection and false-positive rates were achieved as 
presented in Table 6. Thus, it is demonstrated that the 
system is adaptive since it exhibited improvements after 
being trained with new data. 
 
6. Conclusions  
 
In this work a serial combination of two GA-based 
IDSes with opposite qualities is introduced. The 
properties including adaptability of the resulting system 
were analyzed. The proposed combination is 
demonstrated to be very favorable for mitigating the 
negative aspects of the first system in the series. As our 
system uses only six features to describe the data, its time 
of training and decision making is considerably reduced, 
thus providing the possibility of real-world deployment. 
As previously stated in the Introduction, three common 
problems of intrusion detection systems are speed, 
accuracy and adaptability. In this work, the problem of the 
speed in addressed by deploying small subsets of features 
for describing network connections. In this way, the 
periods of training and testing a certain system have been 
highly decreased. Introducing incremental genetic 
algorithm as the approach for evolving the population has 
also very positive impact on the time of training since the 
populations contains small number of individuals at the 
beginning of the process of evolution. Next, the gained 
performances of the presented systems demonstrate high 
accuracy of the implemented system. Finally, adaptability 
of the implemented system has been tested by re-training 
the systems with additional data. After the process of re-
training, enhancement of performances has been 
confirmed. Thus, it is demonstrated that the system 
implemented in this work has successfully addressed and 
solved the problems of intrusion detection systems.  
The benefits of deploying GAs to intrusion detection 
have also been demonstrated. Due to their possibility of 
fast searching of the space of the possible solutions high 
detection rate was achieved within small amount of time. 
The possibility of re-training the results obtained after a 
process of evolution has resulted in high adaptability of 
the system to the changes of environment. Unfortunately, 
due to the dataset used for training and testing whose 
distribution of data is not very realistic (only 20% of data 
are normal connections) the possibility GAs of detecting 
rare events couldn’t be demonstrated. Part of our future 
work will be dedicated to the proper adjustment of the 
dataset, since simple over-sampling and under-sampling 
are reported to exhibit weaknesses [7] resulting in 
degraded performances of the trained system. 
As real-world network data is unlabeled, and 
considering that labeling network data would be an 
extensive engineering task, the algorithm could be adapted 
to be able to work with unlabeled data. This can be 
performed only by defining appropriate fitness function. 
The fitness function should be able to properly define the 
performance of the individual without previously knowing 
whether a connection is an attack or not.  
The principal idea of this work was to indicate the 
advantages of deploying such a system in intrusion 
detection. Our future work will consist in pursuing a real 
application of the system presented here, thus we will be 
able to provide the results based on real-world network 
data.  
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